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SENSE AND SENTENCING: OUR IMPRISONMENT
EPIDEMIC
MICHAEL A. SIMONS*
INTRODUCTION: A CONFESSION
Confession is good for the soul, and so I want to begin this essay with a
confession. But first, some background.
I am a sentencing scholar. For the past decade or so, I have devoted
much of my time to thinking and writing about sentencing. My scholarly
focus is hardly surprising, given my professional experience. I became a
lawyer shortly after the United States Sentencing Guidelines went into
effect in 1987, and I spent much of the first decade of my career directly
engaged with the practice of federal criminal law - as a law clerk to a
federal district judge, as a criminal defense attorney, and as a federal
prosecutor. In each of those positions, the Guidelines were a constant
presence, and I was able to witness first-hand the competition among
judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers for control of the ultimate
sentence.
And so, when I joined the academy, it was natural that I would write
about the sentencing process. In that, of course, I have not been alone. In
many ways, the Guidelines have ushered in what can be considered a
Golden Age of sentencing scholarship. Much of that scholarship, including
mine, focused on the distribution of sentencing discretion. In other words,
it focused on questions surrounding how sentencing power should be
divided among Congress, judges, and prosecutors.' That division of that
* Dean and John V. Brennan Professor of Law & Ethics, St. John's University School of Law; Senior
Fellow, Vincentian Center for Church and Society; Fellow, Ronald H. Brown Center for Civil Rights
and Economic Development. I want to thank my colleagues Leonard M. Baynes and Janai S. Nelson, as
well as the student editors of the Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development, for organizing a
wonderful symposium to celebrate the rich diversity of the St. John's faculty's engagement with
questions of racial, social, and economic justice. I also want to thank Nicole Rubin and Amelie
Brewster for stellar research assistance.
I See, e.g., James B. Burns et al., We Make the Better Target (But the Guidelines Shifted Power
from the Judiciary to Congress, Not from the Judiciary to the Prosecution), 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1317
passim (1997) (discussing the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines' effect on the distribution of
sentencing discretion); Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the
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power has obvious practical consequences for defendants, and it implicates
a wide variety of topics for scholars: the mandatory or advisory nature of
the Guidelines, the constitutionality of various sentencing procedures, the
advisability of mandatory minimum sentences, the effect of prosecutorial
charging policies, the sentencing of corporations, and the technical
particulars of Guidelines operation, including departure authority, relevant
conduct, specific offender characteristics, cooperation, and so on.2 It has
been a good time to be a sentencing scholar.
And now, the confession: I fear I have missed the point. While I
concerned myself with unpacking sentencing discretion, the United States
ended up with over two million of its citizens incarcerated. 3 While I
concerned myself with how the sentence was determined, I lost sight of the
more basic question: How long is the sentence? 4 And unfortunately, that
Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REv. 393, 408 (2001) (detailing the prosecutor's broad discretion in
determining the length, nature, and severity of the sentence); Nancy J. King, Judicial Oversight of
Negotiated Sentences in a World of Bargained Punishment, 58 STAN. L. REv. 293, 302 (2005) (calling
for judicial oversight of sentence bargaining); Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction:
Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1211, 1265 (2004) (recommending legislative elimination
or curtailment of mandatory sentences); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections
on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1938, 1951-52 (1988) (noting the failures of
the sentencing guidelines); Julie R. O'Sullivan, In Defense of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines' Modified
Real-Offense System, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1342 passim (1997) (summarizing the ways in which the
Guidelines minimized the effect of prosecutorial charging decisions); Michael A. Simons, Prosecutors
as Punishment Theorists: Seeking Sentencing Justice, 16 GEO. MASON L. REv. 303 passim (2009)
(discussing prosecutorial sentencing discretion in the advisory Guidelines era); Hon. Bruce M. Selya &
Matthew R. Kipp, An Examination of Emerging Departure Jurisprudence Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1, 26 (1991) (acknowledging criticisms of the
Guidelines for failing to take into account a human element).
2 See U. S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING app. a, bibliog.
(2004) (listing over 200 articles and books and providing just a taste of the rich scholarly literature on
sentencing under the Guidelines).
3 See WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2008 8 (2009) [hereinafter
SABOL ET AL.], available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p08.pdf; King's College London
School of Law, International Center for Prison Studies, World Prison Brief, http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta
/law/research/icps/worldbrief/wpb stats.php (last visited Apr. 19, 2010).
4 I do not want to exaggerate my failings. My work has inevitably been concerned with sentence
length, though usually indirectly. See, e.g., Michael A. Simons, Departing Ways: Uniformity, Disparity
and Cooperation in Federal Drug Sentences, 47 VILL. L. REv. 921, 955-56 (2002). But, like many
sentencing scholars, I focused more on the means for arriving at individual sentences, and less on the
overall effect of sentence lengths on American society. Id. Of course, there have been voices crying out
about our embrace of mass incarceration. See, e.g., Todd R. Clear, The Effects of High Imprisonment
Rates on Communities, 37 CRIME & JUST. 97 passim (2008) (discussing the negative effects that mass
incarceration can have on prisoners' communities); James B. Jacobs, Mass Incarceration and the
Proliferation of Criminal Records, 3 ST. THOMAS L.J. 387, 387 (2006) (arguing that mass incarceration
leads to a vicious cycle in which former prisoners are shut out of legitimate opportunities, which leads
to more crime); Marc Mauer, Thinking About Prison and Its Impact in the Twenty-First Century, 2
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 607, 609 (2005) (outlining factors which should be considered when studying the
effects of mass incarceration in order to determine whether it has a positive or negative effect on
society); Marc Miller & Daniel J. Freed, The Disproportionate Imprisonment of Low-Level Drug
Offenders, 7 FED. SENT. R. 3 passim (1994) (discussing the explosion in the federal prison population
and the effect of mandatory sentencing); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass
Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1271, 1272 (2004) (focusing on the
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answer to that question is often "far too long."
Over the past thirty years, the most important sentencing development
has not been the legislative adoption of mandatory guidelines, or the
judicial creation of advisory guidelines, or the adoption of a wide variety of
guidelines systems in the states, or the widespread elimination of parole, or
the abandonment of rehabilitation as a sentencing goal. No, the most
important sentencing development has been our rejection of the principal of
parsimony: the notion that a sentence should be as long as - but no longer
than - necessary to accomplish the goals of punishment.5 Instead, we have
replaced parsimony with severity, which has resulted in ever longer prison
sentences and a sharp increase in incarceration rates. Consider this
statistic: over 2.3 million Americans, or about one in every 131 people, are
currently incarcerated. As a country, we are suffering from an
incarceration epidemic. Part I of this article will trace the history of that
epidemic.
And yet, in the midst of this epidemic, there is evidence that the
sentencing pendulum may have finally started to swing back toward
moderation, as Part II of this essay will discuss. Indeed, some politicians
have even begun to recognize that it is politically feasible to replace being
"tough on crime" with being "smart on crime." After thirty-years of ever
increasing severity, there may be reason for hope. We may finally be ready
to talk sense about sentencing.6
I. THE U.S. ADDICTION TO INCARCERATION
A. How Did We Get Here?
The magnitude of our current incarceration rate can be difficult to grasp.
To me, at least, the notion that 2.3 million Americans are incarcerated is
rather abstract. Converting that number into a ratio - approximately one
out of every 131 Americans - makes it somewhat more concrete. Perhaps
the best way to understand our incarceration rate is to compare the United
States to other countries. Incarceration rates are typically measured as the
number of persons incarcerated for every 100,000 residents. Most
effects of mass incarceration on African American communities because the surge in prison populations
has involved African Americans in "grossly disproportionate numbers").
5 18 U.S.C.S. § 3553(a)(2) (2010) (outlining the considerations on which the court should base the
sentence imposed).
6 This essay builds ideas that I first explored in a post on NPR's Talking Justice Blog. See Posting
of Michael A. Simons to NPR's Talking Justice Blog, http://communities.justicetalking.orgfblogs/
day28/archive/2008/01/28/Sense-and-Sentencing.aspx (Jan. 28, 2008, 1:06 PM EST).
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industrialized democracies incarcerate fewer than 200 of every 100,000
residents. So, for example, the Scandinavian countries all have
incarceration rates lower than 74 per 100,000 residents - Denmark (66),
Finland (67), Norway (70), and Sweden (74). Most of the rest of Europe
has incarceration rates of less than 200 per 100,000 residents, including
Ireland (85), Germany (88), France (96), Austria (99), Portugal (106), Italy
(107), Greece (109), England and Wales (152), Turkey (161), and Spain
(165). Other democracies typically have similarly low rates: India (32),
Japan (63), Canada (116), Australia (134). Of the larger countries with
incarceration rates over 200, many are former Soviet republics, including
Turkmenistan (224), Azerbaijan (229), Ukraine (314), Kazakhstan (382),
Belarus (385), and Georgia (423). Other countries with relatively high
incarceration rates include Iran (223), Singapore (274), Thailand (313),
Israel (325), South Africa (325), and Cuba (531). Only two countries of
any significant size have incarceration rates higher than Cuba's: the
Russian Federation at 610 and the United States at 753.7
Worldwide Incarceration Rates (2008)
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7 Roy Walmsley, International Centre for Prison Studies, World
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depstallaw/research/icps/worldbrief/wpbstats.php?
area=all&category=wb_poprate (last visited May 21, 2010).
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Prison Brief, available at
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It was not always so. The United States' staggeringly high incarceration
rate is a relatively recent development. For most of the past ninety years-
through Prohibition in the 1920s and 1930s, through the wartime
difficulties of the 1940s, through the communist scares of the 1950s, and
through the social turmoil of the 1960s and 1970s-our incarceration rate
hovered between 100 and 200 people per 100,000 residents. In 1980, it
climbed into the low 200s, 8 at least in part as a result of a growing trend
away from rehabilitation as the primary objective of sentencing and
towards deterrence and incapacitation. 9 But it was not until the last twenty-
five years that our incarceration rate skyrocketed.
U.S. Incarceration Rates (1930-2009)
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8 See JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, THE PUNISHING DECADE: PRISON AND JAIL ESTIMATES AT THE
MILLENNIUM 4, graph 4 (2000), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/00-
05_REPPunishingDecade AC.pdf (reporting incarceration rates between 1910 and 1990);.SABOL ET.
AL., supra note 3, at 8 (detailing incarceration rates for 2000, 2007 and 2008).
9 See Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal
Justice, 114 HARv. L. REv. 1429, 1429 (2001) (noting that in the past few decades, the criminal justice
system's focus has shifted to preventing future violations through incarceration and control).
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The story behind these numbers is, in many ways, a political one. In
1964, in the face of rising crime rates, presidential candidate Barry
Goldwater made being "tough on crime" a national issue. Although
Goldwater did not win the election, his campaign tactic changed the
politics of crime on the national stage.1o In the 1970s, as the fear of crime
by heroin addicts grew, the governor of New York, Nelson Rockefeller,
pushed for long mandatory sentences for drug crimes. Under the
Rockefeller Drug Laws, which were enacted in 1973, a defendant who was
convicted for possession of four ounces of heroin or cocaine had to serve a
minimum sentence of fifteen years.11
The federal government followed with its own "tough on crime" policies
in the 1980s, when Congress established mandatory minimum sentences
for narcotics offenses and violent crime. 12 Prior to the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1986, judges and parole officers had broad discretion to select an
individualized sentence based on the drug offender's rehabilitative need
and potential.13 This system of almost unfettered judicial discretion came
under increasing attack in the 1970s and early 1980s due to the perceived
unjustness of vast disparities in sentences for similar crimes, widespread
fear about rising drug abuse and drug-related crime, and concerns about the
effectiveness of penal rehabilitation.14 Congress responded with stiff
minimum penalties for offenses involving certain quantities of drugs,
requiring, for instance, a five-year prison term for offenders convicted of
distributing 100 grams of heroin, 500 grams of cocaine, or five grams of
crack. 15
In 1987, the federal Sentencing Guidelines went into effect and
10 See, e.g., TED GEST, CRIME & POLITICS: BIG GOVERNMENT'S ERRATIC CAMPAIGN FOR LAW
AND ORDER 1 (2001).
11 Rockefeller Drug Laws, N.Y. Times, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/time
stopics/subjects/d/drug abuse and traffic/rockefeller druglaws/index.html (last visited Apr. 28,
2010).
12 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 8-11 (1991), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/r-congress/manmin.pdf.
13 See Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law for this Age of Federal Sentencing: The Opportunity
and Needfor Judicial Lawmaking, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 93, 94 (1999).
14 See FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND
SOCIAL POLICY 12-31 (1981) (discussing the rise and fall of rehabilitation as the theoretical
justification for punishment); Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained, and
Other Lessons in Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 679, 686-88
(discussing criticisms of indeterminate sentencing and noting that the public began to blame the
sentencing system for the rising crime rates in the 1970s and 1980s); David A. Sklansky, Cocaine,
Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1286-93 (discussing public fear of drug abuse and
attendant crime in the 1970s and 1980s).
15 See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2001). Those minimum sentences may be doubled for second
offenders. See id at § 841(b).
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established rigid mathematical formulas that resulted in narrow-and often
quite severe-"sentencing ranges" based on the crime and the defendant's
criminal history.16 The Guidelines incorporated the mandatory minimum
sentences of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, and their mandatory nature
restricted a judge's authority to depart from the Guideline range.17 These
sentencing reforms, along with the federal government's elimination of
parole, contributed significantly to the steady rise in the incarceration
rate. 18
In the 1990s, our incarceration rate jumped into the 600sl 9 as an
increasing number of states eliminated parole, enacted "three strikes" laws,
and made regular use of "life without parole" sentences. 20 Since then,
while the rate of increase has begun to slow, the incarceration rate itself has
continued to rise.21 In 2003, we surpassed Russia to become the worldwide
leader in incarceration. 22
We have become, to put it bluntly, an outlier. And our status as the
world's most enthusiastic incarcerator cannot be attributed to anything
unique about American culture, because we have assumed that status only
in the past twenty-five years. Instead, our current incarceration epidemic is
the direct result of political choices, and those choices have created a host
of problems.
16 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A(3) (2009) (presenting sentencing table
used to determine sentence range).
17 See id ch. 1, pt. A(3) (noting that the mandatory minimum sentences of the 1986 Act required
the Commission to depart from its normal practice of drafting Guidelines to reflect pre-Guidelines
practice); Frank 0. Bowman, III, Places in the Heartland: Departure Jurisprudence After Koon, 9 FED.
SENT. R. 19, 19 (1996) (stating that the goal of the Guidelines was to restrict judicial discretion).
18 Between 1986 and 1999, the average federal drug sentence more than doubled. See JOHN
SCALIA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL DRUG OFFENDERS, 1999 wrH TRENDS 1984-99, at 1
(2001). In addition, the number of federal prisoners incarcerated for drug offenses increased by 400
percent during the same time period. See id. at 7.
19 See King's College London School of Law, International Center for Prison Studies, Prison Brief
for the United States of America, http://www.kel.ac.uk/depstallaw/research/
icps/worldbrief/wpb country.php?country-190 (last visited Apr. 28, 2010).
20 See Joan Petersilia, Parole and Prisoner Reentry in the United States, 26 CRIME & JUST. 479,
494-95 (1999) (stating that Maine abolished parole in 1976, and by the end of 1998 fourteen states had
followed suit); Note, A Matter of Life and Death: The Effect of Life- Without-Parole Statutes on Capital
Punishment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1842 (2006) (noting that the number of states with life-without-
parole statutes on the books increased from thirty in 1990 to forty-eight in 2005); Larry Rohter, In Wave
ofAnticrime Fervor, States Rush to Adopt Laws, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1994, at Al (reporting that so-
called three-strikes laws were the most popular of new laws states were enacting to combat crime).
21 WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL., supra note 3, at 8; CHRISTINE S. SCOTT-HAYWARD, VERA INST. OF
JUST., THE FISCAL CRISIS IN CORRECTIONS: RETHINKING POLICIES AND PRACTICES 3 (2009), available
at http://www.vera.org/files/The-fiscal-crisis-in-correctionsJuly-2009.pdf.
22 See MARC MAUER, SENTENCING PROJECT, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL RATES OF
INCARCERATION, 2 (2003), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/
inc comparative-intl.pdf.
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B. What Is Wrong With the Current State of Affairs?
A complete analysis of the costs and benefits of our current incarceration
rate is far beyond the scope of this essay. But a number of problems are
becoming increasingly apparent.
Incarceration is, of course, a necessary evil. But I fear that legitimate
concerns for public safety have allowed us to turn a blind eye to the
suffering caused by the wholesale warehousing of over two million human
beings. While some of the prisoners currently incarcerated are no doubt
dangerous and deserve punishment, more than half are serving time for
nonviolent crimes.23 In a noteworthy speech at the American Bar
Association's Annual Meeting in 2003, Supreme Court Justice Anthony
Kennedy noted the dehumanizing experience of prison and highlighted the
need "to bridge the gap between proper skepticism about rehabilitation on
the one hand and improper refusal to acknowledge that the more than two
million inmates in the United States are human beings whose minds and
spirits we must try to reach."24
Our system of mass incarceration also perpetuates endemic racial
disparity. In 2008, one out of every twenty-one African American males
was in prison, while only one out of 138 white males was incarcerated. In
other words, our incarceration rate for African American men is more than
six times greater than the rate for white men. Thus, although 67 percent of
the United States' population is white and 13 percent is African American,
both groups make up approximately 40 percent of the inmate population. 25
23 Adam M. Gershowitz, An Informational Approach to the Mass Imprisonment Problem, 40 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 47, 52, 67 (2008).
24 Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., Speech at the American Bar
Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003) [hereinafter Kennedy Speech], available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeeches.aspx?Filename=sp_08-09- 0 3 .html.
25 Press Release, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Dep't of Justice, Growth in Prison and Jail
Populations Slowing: 16 States Report Declines in the Number of Prisoners (Mar. 31, 2009), available
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/2009/BJS090331
.htm; see also Hearing on Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice System Before the Subcomm. on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Illth Cong. (2009)
(statement of Dr. Barry Krisberg, President, Nat'l Council on Crime and Delinquency), [hereinafter
Hearing on Racial Disparities] available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear-091029.html.
160
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Racial Disparities in Incarceration (2008)
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The reasons for this racial disparity are numerous and complex, but one
evident cause is our approach to the "war on drugs." Although African
Americans made up 14 percent of drug users in 2005, they represented 53
percent of the persons incarcerated for drug offenses. 26 In some cities, as
Justice Kennedy pointed out during his ABA speech, "more than 50
percent of young African-American men are under the supervision of the
criminal justice system."27 While some of the racial disparity in
incarceration may be explained by differing patterns of criminal activity, a
2004 study by the Sentencing Project concluded that nearly 40 percent of
26 See Hearing on Racial Disparities supra note 25 (statement of Marc Mauer, Exec. Director, The
Sentencing Project) available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear
091029.html; see also Hearing on Racial Disparities, supra note 25 (statement of Rep. Steve Cohen)
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear_091029.html (stating that well-documented racial
disparities at various stages of the criminal justice system include "racial profiling of potential suspects,
prosecutorial discretion over changing and plea bargaining decisions, mandatory minimum sentences,
and countless other policies and decisions").
27 Kennedy Speech, supra note 24.
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the disproportionately high incarceration rates of African Americans cannot
be attributed to greater involvement in crime. 28
There is also little evidence that long prison sentences have been
effective in reducing crime. 29 Instead, the evidence suggests that deterrence
is most effectively accomplished by arrest and rapid prosecution, not by
enhanced sentence length. 30 Indeed, mass incarceration may actually
worsen crime rates. In recent years, approximately 650,000 prisoners have
reentered society each year and the recidivism rates of those prisoners are
striking: approximately 67 percent of former state prisoners and 40 percent
of former federal prisoners re-offend within three years. 31
Aside from societal costs, our addiction to incarceration also bears a
considerable monetary price. A recent survey of 37 states indicated that
those states spent nearly $52 billion on corrections in 2008, a 300-percent
increase since 1988 (which, not surprisingly, tracks the 300-percent
increase in incarceration rates over that same time period). Throughout
most of the incarceration boom, those costs have been borne without
complaint (indeed, often with encouragement from communities eager for
the jobs created by nearby prisons. Now, however, we are mired in the
second year of a deep recession, and a growing number of states are facing
severe budget deficits that threaten funding for healthcare, education, and
other public services. In this economic climate, the costs of mass
incarceration have increasingly come under attack. 32
28 Hearing on Racial Disparities supra note 25 (statement of Marc Mauer, Exec. Director, The
Sentencing Project) available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear
091029.htrnl. The most recent analysis of federal sentencing by the United States Sentencing
Commission has reached similarly disturbing conclusions. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMMISSION, DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN FEDERAL SENTENCING PRACTICES: AN UPDATE OF THE
BOOKER REPORT'S MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS (March 2010) The analysis concluded, after
controlling for other variables, that "Black male offenders received longer sentences than white male
offenders" and that such disparities have increased since judges were given more discretion over
sentence lengths in 2005. Id.
29 John M. Darley, On the Unlikely Prospect ofReducing Crime Rates by Increasing the Severity of
Prison Sentences, 13 J.L. & POL'Y 189passim (2005).
30 See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role ofDeterrence in the Formulation of Criminal
Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 954 (2003) (discussing the meaningful
chance for punishment and a lack of delay in being punished as important for deterrence).
31 PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994 1 (2002), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov
/content/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf (reporting recidivism rates for prisoners from fifteen states); MILES D.
HARER, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, RECIDIVISM AMONG FEDERAL PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1987,
at 1, available at http://www.bop.gov/news/research projects/published
reports/recidivism/oreprrecid87.pdf (discussing recidivism rates of federal prisoners).
32 See Scomr-HAYWARD, supra note 21, at 3 (noting that 43 states are facing an aggregate budget
gap of$ 100 billion in fiscal year 2009).
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II. HOPE FOR THE FUTURE
In January 2008, in the midst of a hotly-contested Democratic
presidential primary, then-candidate Barack Obama issued a position paper
outlining his criminal justice priorities. His announced proposals included
eliminating the sentencing disparity between crack and cocaine offenses,
reducing or eliminating mandatory sentences to stop the "ineffective
warehousing of non-violent drug offenders," increasing the use of drug
courts that focus on treatment instead of incarceration, and increasing
programs for released offenders to reduce recidivism. 33 In making these
proposals, Obama was hardly breaking new ground. Judges and academics
had been making similar arguments for years.34 But, it was a bold move for
a presidential candidate to risk being labeled "soft on crime." And yet,
Obama's proposed criminal justice reforms did not become a political
liability.35 It in no way disparages the sincerity of Obama's views to point
out the obvious: He had made the political calculation that being
reflexively "tough on crime" was no longer a requirement for a presidential
candidate. He recognized, several months before the economic crisis, that
public views about crime and incarceration were shifting in important
ways.
Since taking office, President Obama has continued to support
sentencing reform. His administration has replaced the old "tough on
crime" mantra with a new one: "smart on crime." This new approach,
according to Attorney General Eric Holder, involves "thinking about crime
in context-not just reacting to the criminal acts, but developing the
government's ability to enhance public safety before the crime is
committed and after the former offender is returned to society." In more
concrete terms, the administration advocates treatment and reentry
programs to prevent recidivism, as well as evidence-based methods to
develop incarceration alternatives and programs that target at-risk
individuals before they commit crimes. The Department of Justice is also
conducting a review of federal sentencing and corrections policy in order to
use the findings as a basis for sentencing reform legislation.36 And, while
33 Obarna'08, Barack Obama: Creating Equal Opportunity and Justice for All,
http://obama.3cdn.net/98f87f977e34c1d670_50lumvuin.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2010).
34 See, e.g., Kennedy Speech, supra note 24; Beth A. Colgan, Teaching a Prisoner to Fish: Getting
Tough on Crime by Preparing Prisoners to Reenter Society, 5 SEATTLE J. Soc. JUST. 293 (2006);
Martin H. Pritikin, Is Prison Increasing Crime?, 2008 WIS. L. REv. 1049 (2008); Hon. Michael A.
Wolff, Evidence-Based Judicial Discretion: Promoting Public Safety Through State Sentencing Reform,
83 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1389 (2008).
35 Indeed, it appears that they got very little attention at all.
36 Eric Holder, U.S. Att'y Gen., Speech at the 2009 ABA Convention (Aug. 3, 2009) [hereinafter
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President Obama has hit several political bumps in the road, none of them
has been related to his support for "smart on crime" policies.
In addition to the Obama administration's new rhetoric about
incarceration, other recent developments suggest that the cycle of ever
increasing severity in sentencing may finally be broken. In 2005, the
Supreme Court ruled that the sentencing ranges established by the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines were no longer mandatory, but rather merely
advisory.37 Judges must still calculate a Guidelines range, but that range is
just a starting point, and the sentence can be varied up or down
significantly to "impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than
necessary," to comport with the traditional purposes of punishment:
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. 38 In 2007, in two
cases involving lengthy Guidelines sentences for drug offenders, the Court
emphasized that sentencing judges have wide judicial discretion to impose
sentences below the narrow Guidelines range based on the defendant's
individual situation.39
Also in 2007, the United States Sentencing Commission amended the
Guidelines to reduce the disparity between crack and powder cocaine
sentences from a 100-to-i ratio to ratios varying at different offense levels
between 25-to-1 and 80-to-1. The Commission expects that this
modification "will result in a reduction in the estimated average sentence of
all crack cocaine offenses from 121 months to 106 months." 40 This change
to the Guidelines is retroactive, so that almost 20,000 prisoners are now
Holder Speech] (discussing the use of data and research to shape sentencing policy).
37 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
38 See id. at 245-46, 260 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2000)).
39 In Gall v. United States, the Court held that a sentence of 36 months parole-instead of the
Guidelines' 30 to 37 months of imprisonment-was reasonable given the judge's individualized
assessment of the circumstances of the case and the defendant's characteristics, which included his
youth and immaturity at the time of the offense and the fact that he "self-rehabilitated" and stopped
selling drugs more than three years before his indictment. 552 U.S. 38, 41-43, 56-60 (2007). In
Kimbrough v. United States, a case involving the distribution of crack cocaine, the Court upheld the
district court judge's decision to impose a below-Guidelines sentence-15 years, as opposed to 19 to
22.5 years-based on the judge's disagreement with disparity between crack and powder cocaine
sentences. The Court held that the Guidelines' 100-to-I ratio for crack and powder cocaine offenses
was not mandatory, even though it was set by Congress in the 1986 Act. 552 U.S. 85, 91-93, 102-103,
110-112 (2007).
40 See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 106; U.S. SENTENCING GuIDELINES MANuAL app. C, supp., at
amend. 706 (2009). While the pre-amendment Guidelines ranges for crack offenses started above the
statutory mandatory minimum, the ranges now include the minimum sentences. For instance, under the
pre-amendment Guidelines, offenses involving 5 grams of crack cocaine received base offense level 26
and a sentencing range of 63 to 78 months, which exceeded the five-year (60-month) statutory
mandatory minimum by three months. Under the current Guidelines, 5 grams of crack are assigned a
base offense level of 24, corresponding to a sentencing range of 51 to 63 that includes the 60-month
mandatory sentence. Offenses involving other quantities of crack cocaine are similarly reduced by two
base offense levels in the amended Guidelines. Id.
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eligible for sentence reductions. Eighty-six percent of those prisoners are
black.41
States have also taken steps to reduce their incarceration rates and costs.
In 2008, several states implemented initiatives aimed at keeping non-
violent offenders out of prison, such as declaring marijuana enforcement to
be a low law enforcement priority and expanding the use of drug courts and
home incarceration. In addition, some states addressed racial disparities by
enacting laws that require "racial and ethnic impact statements" to assess
the potential effect of new legislation on minority communities. Others
focused on recidivism reduction, shorter prison terms, and review of
sentencing policies. The Sentencing Project, which conducted a survey of
state-level criminal justice policy developments, concluded that although
these reforms are promising, most "fail to address the most significant
engines of the growth of the correctional system," including
disproportionately long sentences, life without parole, and minimum
mandatory sentences. 42
In 2009, New York addressed some of these "tough on crime" policies in
its reform of the state's Rockefeller drug laws. The reform bill eliminated
many minimum mandatory sentences, restored judicial discretion, and
enhanced drug treatment programs and reentry initiatives. New York, in
fact, began implementing programs focusing on incarceration altematives,
rapid deposition of cases, drug courts, data analysis for crime prevention,
and shorter sentences for non-violent offenders long before the current
economic crises forced other states to act. Not surprisingly, the state saw
its prison population decline by 9 percent over the past decade, as other
states experienced a steady increase. 43
Of course, while these signs of sentencing reform are cause for hope,
they hardly represent a fundamental shift in sentencing policy. To date, the
Obama administration's criminal justice reforms have been mostly talk.
The Sentencing Commission's revisions to the sentencing ranges for crack
cocaine still leave in place the statutory mandatory minimum sentences,
41 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, supp., at amend. 713 (stating that Amendment
706 should be applied retroactively and discussing the Commission's reasons); Darryl Fears, Panel May
Cut Sentences for Crack: Thousands Could Be Released Early, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 2007, at Al
(discussing the effects of making the amended Guidelines retroactive).
42 See RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE STATE OF SENTENCING 2008:
DEVELOPMENTS IN POLICY AND PRACTICE 2-11 (2009).
43 Holder Speech, supra note 36; Jackie Rothenberg, For State Prisons, West Isn't Best: California
Clogs Its Jails While New York's Court Reform Frees Funds, 95 A.B.A. J. 15, 15-16 (2009); New York
State Assembly, 2009 NYS Assembly Significant Legislation, http://assembly.state.ny.us/Press/2009
SigLeg/#1nk9 (last visited April 29, 2010) (bringing the user directly to the significant legislation
regarding corrections, including Rockefeller Drug Law reform).
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which contain the infamous 100-to-i ratio.44 And a recent survey of state-
level criminal justice policy developments concluded that while reforms
such as racial impact statements and reentry programs are promising, most
"fail to address the most significant engines of the growth of the
correctional system," including disproportionately long sentences, life
without parole, and minimum mandatory sentences.45
There is much more to be done. And yet, the time may be right for real
meaningful reform. Whether prompted by falling crime rates, persistent
recidivism, or rising corrections budgets, policy makers are increasingly
exploring reforms that have the potential to make a real difference. Many
states are rethinking the "war on drugs" and redirecting resources to
treatment, particularly of addiction and mental illness. Many states are
focusing their sentencing policies on reducing recidivism rather than on
"punishing" offenders. One promising avenue of exploration is "evidence-
based sentencing," which uses rigorous empirical analysis in an effort to
identify those offenders who must be incarcerated to protect society and
those who can be effectively punished without resort to lengthy
incarceration. 46 The current budget crisis has only given more momentum
to these efforts to reign in rampant incarceration.
After a three-decade march toward ever-increasing sentencing severity,
Americans may be ready for a different approach. President Obama seems
to think so. Granted, Obama's proposals relate only to federal law and
none has yet been enacted. But the particulars of his proposals are less
important than the fact that he is willing to make them. For years,
politicians have avoided even talking about sentencing reform for fear of
being labeled "soft on crime." That reticence is not surprising, as the
44 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, supp., at amend. 716 (noting that "[a]ny
comprehensive solution to the 100-to-I drug quantity ratio requires appropriate legislative action by
Congress"); THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FEDERAL CRACK COCAINE SENTENCING 1, 6-8 (2009),
available at http://sentencingproject.org/detail
publication.cfm?publication-id=153 (discussing recent developments in federal crack cocaine
sentencing and concluding that the "likelihood of legislative reform in the 111th Congress is the
strongest it has ever been"). It is also worth noting that any changes to federal sentencing practices
would not significantly reduce incarceration rates since most prisoners are incarcerated by the states,
not by the federal government. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Total Correctional Population,
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfn?ty-tp
&tid=1 1 (last visited April 29, 2010) (stating the number of prisoners under state jurisdiction was
1,409,166, while the number of those under federal jurisdiction was 201,280 as of midyear 2008).
45 See KING, supra note 42.
46 See THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, ARMING THE COURTS WITH RESEARCH: 10 EVIDENCE-
BASED SENTENCING INITIATIVES TO CONTROL CRIME AND REDUCE COSTS 4 (2009), passim; see also
Holder Speech, supra note 36; Symposium, Evidence-Based Sentencing: The New Frontier in
Sentencing Policy and Practice, I CHAP. J. CRIM. JUST. 1 (2009).
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primary beneficiaries of sentencing reform - prisoners and their
communities - tend not to wield much political clout. But that only
increases the moral imperative to think seriously about these issues.
Real sentencing reform requires real leadership - from the President,
from Congressional leaders, and from policy makers in all fifty states. If
policy makers are willing to talk sense about sentencing, they may find that
the American public is willing to listen. Being "smart on crime" may set us
on a path to curing our imprisonment epidemic.
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Appendix A
Prison Population Rates per 100,000 of the national population
I United States of America 753
2 St. Kitts and Nevis 660
3 Russian Federation 610
4 Rwanda 593
5 Virgin Islands (USA) 561
6 Cuba c.531
7 Virgin Islands (United Kingdom) 488
8 Palau 478
9 Belize 476
10 Georgia 423
11 Bahamas 407
12 Anguilla (United Kingdom) 401
13 Bermuda (United Kingdom) 394
14 Belarus 385
15 Kazakhstan 382
16 Seychelles 371
17 French Guiana/Guyane (France) 365
18 Grenada 358
19 Suriname c.356
20 Cayman Islands (United Kingdom) 346
20 St. Vincent and the Grenadines 346
22 Maldives 343
23 Antigua and Barbuda 329
24 Barbados 326
25 Israel 325
25 South Africa 325
27 Dominica 324
28 Latvia 319
28 Netherlands Antilles (Netherlands) 319
30 Ukraine 314
31 Thailand 313
32 Puerto Rico (USA) 303
32 St. Lucia 303
34 Chile 301
35 Trinidad and Tobago 293
36 Panama 292
37 Guam (USA) 287
38 Taiwan 279
39 Singapore 274
40 El Salvador 273
40 Estonia 273
42 Guyana 272
43 Aruba (Netherlands) 269
44 Botswana 267
45 Tunisia c.263
46 Uruguay 244
47 Brazil 242
48 United Arab Emirates 238
49 Greenland (Denmark) 234
49 Lithuania 234
51 Azerbaijan 229
Walmsley, supra note 7.
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52 Costa Rica 224
52 Turkmenistan 224
54 Iran 223
55 Poland 220
56 Swaziland 219
57 Czech Republic 204
57 Mexico 204
59 Libya 200
60 American Samoa (USA) 198
61 New Zealand 197
62 Gabon 196
63 Namibia 194
64 Martinique (France) 191
65 Jersey (United Kingdom) 190
66 Dominican Republic 189
67 Mongolia 188
68 Moldova (Republic of) 184
69 Cape Verde (Cabo Verde) 178
69 Saudi Arabia 178
71 Gibraltar (United Kingdom) 174
71 Guadeloupe (France) 174
71 Jamaica 174
74 Macau (China) 173
75 Colombia 167
75 Morocco 167
77 Mauritius 166
78 Spain 165
79 Honduras 161
79 Reunion (France) 161
79 Turkey 161
82 Albania 159
82 Lebanon 159
84 Algeria 158
85 Luxembourg 155
86 French Polynesia (France) 153
86 Hungary 153
86 Montenegro 153
89 United Kingdom: England & Wales 152
90 Peru 151
90 Slovakia 151
92 United Kingdom: Scotland 146
93 Lesotho 144
94 Serbia 143
95 Northern Mariana Islands (USA) 142
96 Hong Kong (China) 141
97 Australia 134
98 Kyrgyzstan 133
98 New Caledonia (France) 133
100 Argentina 132
100 Myanmar (formerly Burma) 132
102 Kuwait 130
103 Burundi 129
103 Sri Lanka 129
105 Isle of Man (United Kingdom) 127
105 Malaysia 127
107 Cook Islands (New Zealand) 126
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107 Ecuador 126
109 Romania 125
110 Bulgaria 124
Ill Armenia 122
111 Uzbekistan c.122
113 Fiji 120
113 Malta 120
113 Zambia 120
116 China 119
117 Jordan 118
118 Guernsey (United Kingdom) 117
118 Kenya 117
120 Canada 116
121 Brunei Darussalam 115
122 Cameroon 114
122 Zimbabwe 114
124 Philippines 111
125 Greece 109
125 Tajikistan 109
127 Croatia 107
127 Italy 107
127 Macedonia (former Yugoslav Republic of) 107
127 Nicaragua 107
127 Vietnam 107
132 Iraq 106
132 Portugal 106
134 Netherlands 100
135 Austria 99
135 Samoa (formerly Western Samoa) 99
137 Ethiopia c.98
138 Republic of (South) Korea 97
139 France 96
140 Bahrain 95
140 Paraguay 95
142 Belgium 94
143 Tanzania 92
144 Uganda 91
145 Madagascar 90
146 Egypt 89
146 Micronesia, Federated States of 89
146 Tonga 89
149 Germany 88
150 Ireland, Republic of 85
150 Mayotte (France) 85
150 Venezuela 85
153 Cyprus (Republic of) 83
153 Haiti 83
153 Sao Tome e Principe 83
153 Yemen 83
157 Bolivia 80
158 Cambodia 79
158 Papua New Guinea 79
160 Malawi 78
160 Marshall Islands 78
162 United Kingdom: Northern Ireland 77
163 Kiribati 76
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163 Monaco 76
163 Switzerland 76
166 Sweden 74
167 Mozambique c.73
168 Guatemala 70
168 Norway 70
170 Laos 69
171 Bosnia and Herzegovina: Federation 67
171 Finland 67
173 Benin 66
173 Bosnia and Herzegovina: Republika Srpska 66
173 Denmark 66
176 Slovenia 65
176 Togo 65
178 Japan 63
179 Kosovo/Kosova c.62
180 Djibouti 61
180 Indonesia 61
180 Oman 61
183 Syria 58
184 Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) c.57
185 Cote d'Ivoire 56
185 Ghana 56
187 Iceland 55
187 Pakistan 55
187 Qatar 55
190 Senegal 53
190 Vanuatu 53
192 Angola c.52
192 Mali 52
194 Bangladesh 51
195 Niger 46
196 Sudan 45
197 Afghanistan 44
198 Sierra Leone 41
199 Liberia 40
200 Andorra 37
200 Republic of Guinea 37
202 Chad 35
203 Solomon Islands 34
204 Gambia 32
204 India 32
206 Congo (Brazzaville) c.31
207 Comoros c.30
208 Central African Republic c.29
209 Burkina Faso 27
209 Nigeria 27
211 Mauritania 26
212 Faeroe Islands (Denmark) 25
212 Tuvalu 25
214 Nepal c.24
215 Nauru 23
216 Liechtenstein 20
216 Timor-Leste (formerly East Timor) 20
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